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Christian Balkenius* and Peter Gärdenfors
Cognitive Science, Lund University, Lund, Sweden
Spaces in the brain can refer either to psychological spaces, which are derived from
similarity judgments, or to neurocognitive spaces, which are based on the activities of
neural structures. We want to show how psychological spaces naturally emerge from
the underlying neural spaces by dimension reductions that preserve similarity structures
and the relevant categorizations. Some neuronal representational formats that may
generate the psychological spaces are presented, compared, and discussed in relation
to the mathematical principles of monotonicity, continuity, and convexity. In particular, we
discuss the spatial structures involved in the connections between perception and action,
for example eye–hand coordination, and argue that spatial organization of information
makes such mappings more efficient.
Keywords: chorus transform, conceptual spaces, eye–hand coordination, population coding, radial basis function,
similarity, stimulus generalization
1. INTRODUCTION
Within psychology there is considerable evidence that many aspects of human perception and
categorization can be modeled by assuming an underlying spatial structure (Shepard, 1987;
Gärdenfors, 2000). A paradigmatic example is the color space (Vos, 2006; Renoult et al., 2015), but
also, for example, the emotion space (Russell, 1980; Mehrabian, 1996) and musical space (Longuet-
Higgins, 1976; Shepard, 1982; Large, 2010) have been extensively studied. Within cognitive
linguistics, such spaces are also assumed to be carriers of meaning. For example, Gärdenfors (2000,
2014) has proposed that the semantic structures underlying major word classes such as nouns,
adjectives, verbs and prepositions can be analyzed in terms of “conceptual spaces.”
For some of the psychological spaces, there exist models that connect neural structures to
perception. For example, it is rather well understood how the different types of cones and rods
in the human retina result in the psychological color space (see Renoult et al., 2015 for a review).
The mammalian brain sometimes represents space in topographic structures. A clear example is
the three layers in the superior colliculus for visual, auditory and tactile sensory inputs (Stein and
Meredith, 1993). Another example of a topographic representation is the mapping from pitch to
position in the cochlea and the tonotopic maps of auditory cortex (Morel et al., 1993; Bendor and
Wang, 2005).
For most psychological spaces, however, the corresponding neural representations are not
known. Our aim in this article is to investigate the hypothesis that also other representing
mechanisms in the brain can be modeled in terms of spatial structures, even if they are not directly
mapped onto topographic maps. We present some neuronal representational formats that may
generate the psychological spaces. We want to show how psychological spaces naturally emerge
from the underlying neural spaces by dimension reduction that preserve similarity structures and
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thereby preserve relevant categorizations. In this sense, the
psychological and the neural spaces correspond to two different
levels of representation.
Furthermore, we argue that spatial representations are
fundamental to perception since they naturally support similarity
judgments. In a spatial representation, two stimuli are similar
to each other if they are close in the space (Hutchinson and
Lockhead, 1977; Gärdenfors, 2000). Spatial representations also
help generalization since a novel stimulus will be represented
close to other similar stimuli in the space, and will thus be likely
to belong to the same category or afford the same actions.
One of the main tasks of the brain is to mediate between
perception and action (Churchland, 1986; Jeannerod, 1988; Stein
and Meredith, 1993; Milner and Goodale, 1995). We argue
that this task is supported by spatial representations. When
both the sensory input and the motor output use a spatial
representation, the task of mapping from perception to action
becomes one of mapping between two spaces. To be efficient,
spatial representations need to obey some general qualitative
constraints on such a mapping. We focus on continuity,
monotonicity, and convexity.
In the following section we present some basic psychological
spaces and possible connections with neural representations.
In Section 3, the role of similarity in psychological spaces,
in particular in relation to categorization is presented and
conceptual spaces are introduced as modeling tools. Section 4
is devoted to arguing that spatial coding is implicit in neural
representations, in particular in population coding. In Section 5,
we show how spatial structures are used in mappings between
perception and action. Some computational mechanisms, in
particular the chorus transform, are discussed in Section 6.
2. BASIC PSYCHOLOGICAL SPACES
We share many psychological spaces with other animals. In
this section, we briefly present some of the most basic spaces
and outline the representational formats. First and foremost,
most animal species have some representations of the external
physical space. Even in insects such as bees and ants, one can find
advanced systems for navigation (Gallistel, 1990; Shettleworth,
2009). However, the neuro-computational mechanisms that are
used vary considerably between species. Mammals have a spatial
representation system based on place cells in the hippocampus
that are tuned to specific locations in the environment such that
the cell responds every time the animal is in a particular location
(O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978). This system is complemented by
the grid cells in the entorhinal cortex that show more regular
firing patterns that are repeated at evenly spaced locations in the
environment (Moser et al., 2008). Taken together, the responses
of these cells represent a location in space. This code is redundant
in the information theoretical sense since many more neurons
are used than would be strictly necessary to represent a point in
three-dimensional space. One reason for this is that a redundant
coding is less sensitive to noise, but it also supports the spatial
computations made by the brain as we will see in Section 4.
A second example is the emotion space that is shared with
many animal species. Mammals, birds, and other species show
clear indications of at least fear, anger and pleasure and there are
evolutionarily old brain structures that regulate these emotions
and their expressions. For the psychological space of human
emotions, there exist a number of models. Many of these models
can be seen as extensions of Russell’s (1980) two-dimensional
circumplex (Figure 1A). Here, the emotions are organized along
two orthogonal dimensions. The first dimension is valency, going
from pleasure to displeasure; the second is the arousal-sleep
dimension. Russell shows that the meaning of most emotions
words can be mapped on a circumplex spanned by these
two dimensions. Other models of psychological emotion space
sometimes include a third dimension, for example a “dominance”
dimension that expresses the controlling nature of the emotion
(Mehrabian, 1996). For example while both fear and anger are
unpleasant emotions, anger is a dominant emotion, while fear is
non-dominant.
In relation to the topic of this paper, a central question
concerns what are the neurophysiological correlates of the
psychological emotion space. A recent hypothesis is the three-
dimensional emotion cube based on neuromodulators proposed
by Lövheim (2012), where the axes correspond to the level
of serotonin, dopamine and noradrenaline respectively. By
combining high or low values on each of the dimensions, eight
basic emotions can be generated. For example, “fear” corresponds
to high dopamine, low serotonin and noradrenaline, while “joy”
corresponds to high noradrenaline, high serotonin and dopamine
(see Figure 1B). The mapping between the representation in
terms of neurotransmitters and the psychological emotion space
remains to be empirically evaluated, but Lövheim’s model
presents an interesting connection between brain mechanism
and the psychological emotion space. Unlike the coding
of physical space, this representation has a direct relation
between the underlying physiological variables, the transmitter
substances, and the psychological emotion space.
A third example of a psychological space that is shared
between many species is the color space. The human
psychological color space can be described by three dimensions:
The first dimension is hue, which is represented by the familiar
color circle. The second dimension of color is saturation, which
ranges from gray (zero color intensity) to increasingly greater
intensities. The third dimension is brightness, which varies from
white to black and is thus a linear dimension with end points.
There are several models of this human psychological space that
differ in some detail concerning the geometric structure, but they
are all three dimensional (Vos, 2006).
In other animal species, the psychological color space
has only been investigated, via discrimination tasks, for a
limited number of species (Renoult et al., 2015). However, the
dimensionality of the space varies from one-dimensional (black-
white) two-dimensional (in most mammals), three-dimensional
(e.g., in primates), to four-dimensional (in some birds and fish).
For example, some birds with a four-dimensional space can
distinguish between a pure green color and a mixture of blue and
yellow, something that most humans cannot (Jordan andMollon,
1993; Stoddard and Prum, 2008).
The next question then becomes how these various
psychological color spaces can be grounded in the
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Russell’s circumplex with the two basic dimensions of valency and arousal and different emotions arranged in a circular structure. (B) Lövheim’s
emotion cube where the three axes represent the levels of dopamine, noradrenaline, and serotonin respectively.
neurophysiology of the vision systems of different species.
The retinas of tri-chromats such as humans have three types
of cones that generate color perception: short wavelength
(blue), medium wavelength (green) and long wavelength
cones (red). Tetra-chromats typically have an additional type
of cone that is sensitive to ultra-violet light (Endler and
Mielke, 2005). Although every photoreceptor is tuned to a
particular wavelength of light, its response intertwines its
light intensity with spectral content (Hering, 1964). A change
in photoreceptor response can be the results of a change in
light intensity as well as a change in color. It is only when
the responses of receptors with different tuning are combined
that the brain can distinguish between brightness, saturation,
and hue.
There exist different theories regarding the connection
between the signals from the cones and the rods and the perceived
color. One is the opponent-process theory that claims that for
tri-chromats there are three opponent channels: red vs. green,
blue vs. yellow, and black vs. white. The perceived color is then
determined from the differences between the responses of the
cones (Hering, 1964). The theory has received support also in
several animal species with known tri-chromacy, for examples
in primates, fish and bees (see Svaetichin, 1955; De Valois et al.,
1958; Backhaus, 1993). For tetra-chromats, a similar theory has
been proposed (Endler and Mielke, 2005; Stoddard and Prum,
2008).
It is interesting to note that even though both the receptor
space and the psychological color space are both of low
dimension, they are not the same. For example, the subjective
experience of a color circle has no correspondence in sensory
physiology. For humans, the color coded at the receptor level is a
cube while the psychological space has the shape of a double cone.
None of these spaces are a direct representation of the physical
light spectrum.
3. MODELS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL SPACES
3.1. Similarity as a Central Factor
Perhaps the most important cognitive function of the brain is
to provide a mapping from perception to action (Milner and
Goodale, 1995). In the case of simple reflex mechanism, the
mapping is more or less fixed and automatic. In most cases,
however, the mapping has to be learned (Schouenborg, 2004)
and it is a function not only of the current perception, but also
of memory and context (Bouton, 1993). It is central that such a
mapping can be learnable in an efficient way. A general economic
principle for cognition is that similar perceptions should lead to
similar actions. Therefore, similarity should be a fundamental
notion when modeling the mapping from perception to action.
In the behavioristic tradition, connections between stimuli
and responses were investigated. This research lead to the
principle of stimulus generalization that says that, after
conditioning, when the subject is presented with a stimulus that
is similar to the conditioned stimulus, it will evoke a similar
response (Hanson, 1957, 1959). For example, work by Shepard
(1957) was seminal in showing that stimulus generalization can
be explained in terms of similarity between stimuli. Within this
tradition, it was seldom studied what made a stimulus similar to
another. What was meant by similarity was taken for granted or
induced by varying a physical variable (Nosofsky and Zaki, 2002).
If we leave the behavioristic tradition and turn to more
cognitively oriented models, a general assumption is that the
connection between stimuli and responses is mediated by
a categorization process and that it is the outcome of the
categorization that determines the action to be taken. For
example, stimuli are categorized as food or non-food, which then
determines whether an act of eating will take place.
There exist several psychological category learning models
based on similarity. Some are based on forming prototypes of
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categories (Rosch, 1975; Gärdenfors, 2000). One way of using
prototypes to generate concepts is by Voronoi tessellations (see
next subsection) that are calculated by placing any stimulus
in the same category as the nearest prototype (Gärdenfors,
2000). Other category learning methods are based on learning
a number of exemplars for the different concepts in a domain.
(Nosofsky, 1988; Nosofsky and Zaki, 2002). Then a new stimulius
is categorized as the same as its nearest neighbor among the
exemplar. This is also a technique that is commonly used for
pattern recognition in an engineering context (Cover and Hart,
1967).
A general problem for such categorization models is that
only for special types of stimuli it is known how the underlying
similarity structure can be described. For most stimuli, the
modeling will have to be based on hypotheses. The idea that
similar perceptions should lead to similar action can, however, be
formulated in terms of some general principles that a mapping
from perceptions to actions should fulfill. In mathematical terms,
the principles can be described as monotonicity, continuity and
convexity. Monotonicity means that an increase in a perceptual
variable should correspond to an increase in an action variable.
For example, if an object B is perceived as being further away
than object A, then the agent must reach further to grasp B
than to grasp A. Continuity means that small changes in a
perceptual variable should correspond to an small change in
an action variable. Again eye–hand coordination provides an
example: When reaching for an object, the agent makes small
adjustments to hand movements in order to adjust for small
perceptual discrepancies between hand and object. Convexity
means that closed regions of a perceptual space are mapped
onto a closed region of action space. To continue with the
reaching example, this requirement entails that if object C is
located between objects A and B, then the motor signals to
reach C should also lie between the motor signals to reach
A and to reach B. Even if these three requirements do not
determine the mapping from perceptions to actions, they provide
strong constraints on such a mapping. The important thing
to notice is that once perceptions and actions are spatially
represented, a continuous mapping from perception to action
typically also fulfills the criteria of monotonicity and convexity.
These properties are also important from the perspective of
control theory, for example when a robot needs to interpolate
between learned movements in novel situations (Schaal and
Atkeson, 2010).
Furthermore, when an agent is learning, for example, to
coordinate the information from the eyes with the actions of
the hands, the fact that the mapping satisfies these conditions
potentially makes the learning procedure considerably more
efficient. Even with little training, it would be possible to
interpolate between already trained mappings from eye to hand
and to test a movement that likely is close to the correct one.
Under ideal conditions, it is sufficient to have learned how to
reach three points on a plane to be able to reach any position
on that plane. Other points can be reached by interpolating (or
extrapolating) from the movements that reaches each of these
three points. Although such interpolation does not necessarily
lead to a perfect behavior, it is a good starting point and as more
movements are tested the mapping will quickly converge on the
correct one.
3.2. Conceptual Spaces
A modeling problem is how psychological and neurological
spaces can best be represented. Gärdenfors, 2000 proposes that
categories can be modeled as convex regions of a conceptual
space. A psychological conceptual space consists of a number of
domains such as space, time, color, weight, size, and shape, where
each domain is endowed with a particular topology or geometry.
Convexity may seem a strong assumption, but it is a remarkably
regular property of many perceptually grounded categories, for
example, color, taste, and vowels. Although a main argument
for convexity is that it facilitates the learnability of categories
(Gärdenfors, 2000), it is also crucial for assuring the effectiveness
of communication (Warglien and Gärdenfors, 2013). In this
article, we focus on the role of convexity in mappings from
perception spaces to action space.
There are interesting comparisons to make between analyzing
categories as convex regions and the prototype theory developed
by Rosch and her collaborators (Rosch, 1975; Mervis and Rosch,
1981; Lakoff, 1987). When categories are defined as convex
regions in a conceptual space, prototype effects are to be expected.
Given a convex region, one can describe positions in that region
as being more or less central. Conversely, if prototype theory is
adopted, then the representation of categories as convex regions
is to be expected. Assume that some conceptual space is given, for
example, the color space; and that the intention is to decompose
it into a number of categories, in this case, color categories. If
one starts from a set of categories prototypes—say, the focal
colors—then these prototypes should be the central points in
the categories they represent. The information about prototypes
can then be used to generate convex regions by stipulating that
any point within the space belongs to the same categories as the
closest prototype. This rule will generate a certain decomposition
of the space: a so-called Voronoi tessellation (see Figure 2).
The illustration of the tessellation is two-dimensional, but
Voronoi tessellations can be extended to any arbitrary number
of dimensions. An important feature of Voronoi tessellations is
that they always generate a convex partitioning of the space.
The prototype structure of concepts is also central for
modeling meanings of words. Gärdenfors (2000, 2014) develops
a semantic theory where elements from the main word classes are
mapped onto convex regions of domain or convex sets of vectors
over a domain. This way of representing word meanings can
explain many features of how children learn their first language.
Again, the low-dimensional structure of the domains are essential
for rapid learning of new word meanings (Gärdenfors, 2000).
4. SPATIAL CODING IS IMPLICIT IN
NEURAL REPRESENTATIONS
We next turn to a more general account of how space may be
neurally represented. We suggest that a spatial coding is implicit
in most neural mechanisms, and that concepts of distances and
betweenness are readily applicable to such codes.
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FIGURE 2 | Voronoi tessellation of the plane into convex categories.
Each point represents a prototype and the lines show the borders between the
categories.
As a first example, we look at the neurons in motor cortex.
These neurons code for the direction of movement using a
population code where each individual neuron is tuned to
movement in a particular direction (Georgopoulos et al., 1988)
and modulated by distance (Fu et al., 1993). In a population
code, a stimulus or a motor command is coded by the joint
activities of a set of neurons. Before the movement, the response
of each cell is proportional to the angle between the direction
vector represented by that cell and the direction of the following
movement. Cells with vectors close to the movement direction
will respond more than cells that code for different movement
directions.
The set of neurons can be seen as a basis for a highly redundant
high-dimensional coding of a low-dimensional vector space for
movement direction. The responses of all neurons taken together
represent a population vector that can be computed by adding
together the direction vectors of each individual neuron weighted
by its response magnitude (Figures 3A,B). The population vector
is thus the low-dimensional “decoding” of the high-dimensional
population code.
The similarity between two population codes can be calculated
by considering the population codes as vector in the high-
dimensional space. The similarity is defined by the cosine of
the angle between these vectors. This similarity measure varies
between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates identical population codes,
and a value of 0 indicates two maximally dissimilar codes. This is
different from calculating the similarity between the population
vectors that lie in the low-dimensional space. A fundamental
aspect of the population coding is that population codes that
are similar using this measure in the high-dimensional neural
space will produce population vectors that are also similar in the
low-dimensional movement space.
Population codes are not only used for motor coding but
are also used for perceptual tasks. In their seminal study of
population coding of human faces in the anterior inferotemporal
cortex (AIT) and anterior superior temporal polysensory area
(STP) of macaque monkeys, Young and Yamane (1992) showed
that the recorded responses of these brain regions contain
information about the identity (AIT) and possibly familiarity
(STP) of the faces the monkey is viewing. The responses of a
large number of neurons to different faces were recorded. Using
multidimensional scaling, they mapped the recordings onto a
lower dimensional space. The dimensions of this space are not
visible when looking at a single neuron that responds preferably
to a single stimulus and gradually decreases its response as
the stimulus moves away from the preferred one. However, by
looking at the low-dimensional code, they were able to show that
two dimensions explainedmost of the variation in the population
code for each of the two brain regions.
This implies that the macaque brain implicitly uses a low-
dimensional space to code different faces. Although a high-
dimensional population code is used, most of the information
is contained in a small number of dimensions. Each face is
coded in a unique location in this space, and faces coded
close to each other in the space share visual characteristics
such as the amount of hair and the general shape of the face.
The distance between points in this low-dimensional space
represents the similarity between the coded faces (Figure 3C)
and may correspond to the psychological face space of the
monkey.
For both examples of population coding described above,
the underlying space appears to be two-dimensional, but this is
clearly an artifact of the experimental details. In Georgopoulos’
experiments, the monkey moved its arm in two dimensions, the
vectors found are consequently also two-dimensional, but we
must assume that the same principle holds for movement in
three dimensions and possibly also for more complexmovements
that are extended in time and involves more degrees of freedom
(Graziano et al., 2002). The only difference in this case is
that a larger number of dimensions are necessary. Similarly, in
the experiment by Young and Yamane, two dimensions were
sufficient to capturemost of the variation necessary to distinguish
the different faces, but presumably, the monkey could have
access to more dimensions had it been necessary to differentiate
between the faces. The exact number of dimensions in neural
representation is not important as long as a low-dimensional
reduction of the space covers most of the information.
There are two ways to view the coding in the brain—one
at a detailed level, the other at an aggregated level. The first is
to look at each neuron individually. By systematically testing
different stimuli, it is possible to find the stimulus that each
neuron maximally responds to (Tanaka, 2003). In this case, the
neuron is considered a detector tuned to that preferred stimulus.
The preferred stimulus can be seen as the prototype for that
neuron (Edelman and Shahbazi, 2012), and the more similar a
stimulus is to that prototype, the stronger the neuron will react.
The other approach is to look at the whole population of
neurons and view the activity pattern as a point in a high
dimensional space. In this case, the response of each neuron is
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FIGURE 3 | (A,B) The direction vectors from a minimal population of two cells are combined into a population vector. Each cell codes for a particular movement
direction and the responses of the two cells weigh together the two vectors into a combined population vector that corresponds to the subsequent movement
direction. When the response of cell 2 is higher than that of cell 1, the population vector will point in a direction that is closer to vector 2 than that of vector 1. When
cell 1 has the higher response, the population vector will be more aligned with vector 1. (C) A hypothetical face space of the type found by Young and Yamane (1992).
Different faces are arranged along two dimensions where faces that are similar to each other are located close to each other in the space.
seen as a basis function and every stimulus is coded as a blend
of these basis functions1. In this case, the responses of individual
neurons are not necessarily meaningful on their own. Although
these two views may look contrasting, they are actually two sides
of the same coin and are both equally valid.
Although a population code consists of the activity of multiple
neurons that are not necessarily located close to each other on
the cortical surface, Erlhagen and Schöner (2002) have suggested
that neurons that make up a stable activity pattern may be linked
by mutual excitation in such a way that they functionally can be
considered a point in a higher dimensional topographic space.
This is a central component of the Dynamic Field Theory that
studies the temporal dynamics of such activity patterns.
We have here looked at how low dimensional spaces are
implicitly coded in a high dimensional population code, but
the brain also constructs lower dimensional codes explicitly
throughout the sensory system. This is often modeled as
successive steps of dimensionality reduction, or compression,
in hierarchical networks (e.g., Serre et al., 2007). In the
semantic pointer architecture (Eliasmith, 2013), relatively low
dimensional codes that are constructed in this way are used
to define a “semantic space” where different concepts can be
represented. The high dimensional representation at lower levels
in the hierarchy can be partially reconstructed from the low-
dimensional semantic pointer. Furthermore, the architecture
allows for recursive binding through the operation of circular
convolution. Unlike earlier methods using tensor operations
(Smolensky, 1990), circular convolution does not increase the
1Basis functions are elementary function that can be linearly combined to produce
more complex functions in a particular function space.
dimensionality of the representation and can be performed in
several successive steps to produce deep embeddings (Blouw
et al., 2015). Many other forms of binding mechanisms are
discussed by van der Velde and De Kamps (2006). Common to all
are that the individual constituents can have the spatial structure
described above.
5. THE USE OF SPACES AS MAPPINGS
BETWEEN PERCEPTION AND ACTION
We next turn to neuro-cognitive models that include both the
sensory and the motor side. Specifically, we want to show that
sensory-motor mappings can be described as mappings between
points in low-dimensional spaces, Here we only consider basic
examples of sensory-motor mappings, but the principles we
present are general.
A direct form of sensory to motor mapping is used when we
keep our head stationary and let the eyes saccade to an object.
The location of the object is captured in eye-centered coordinates
and it is necessary to convert these into the appropriate motor
commands to move the eyes to that location. This sensory-
motor transformation can be seen as a mapping between two
representational spaces, one for the object location and one for
the movements of the eyes.
For a saccade, the mapping is relatively simple since every
location on the retina could in principle be mapped to a unique
motor command (Salinas and Abbott, 1995). When a target is
detected on the retina, a motor command would be produced
that would point the eye in the correct direction. There would
thus be one eye direction vector for each retinal position. Here,
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the desired gaze direction is a function of the target location
on the retina and the function satisfies the three conditions of
monotonicity, continuity and convexity. As the target moves
further away from the center of the eye, the required movement
is larger and the mapping is thus monotone. A small change
in the target position on the retina, requires a small change of
the corresponding movement. The mapping is thus continuous.
It also follows that the convexity criteria is met since the
movements are mapped out in an orderly fashion over the
retina. The movement to a target that is projected between two
arbitrary points on the retina lies somewhere in-between the two
movements required for the two points.
Deneve and Pouget (2003) suggested that mappings from
sensory to motor systems could be performed using basis
function maps. Such maps use basis functions to represent all
possible stimuli in such a way that linear combinations of basis
functions can compute any motor command. More specifically,
they propose that the neurons of the supplementary eye field
of the parietal cortex form a set of basis units. Each basis unit
corresponds to a single prototype in the sensory space. The
output from the unit codes the distance from the input to that
prototype. The task for the subjects in their experiment was to
saccade to the left or the right part of an object that appeared
at an arbitrary location and orientation on the retina. This task
is interesting since it requires that the whole object is identified
before it is possible to localize its sides and thus it appears to
require object-centered representations and as such a sequence of
coordinate transformation would be necessary. However, Deneve
and Pouget showed that this task can be performed as a single
mapping by a three layer network where the middle layer consists
of basis function units (Figure 4). The basis units work together
so that inputs that match several basis units will produce an
output that is a combination of the outputs from each of the
FIGURE 4 | A three-layer neural network. The input x is mapped onto a
population code p(x) in a hidden layer where each neuron (or basis unit) is
tuned to different position in the input space (its prototype). The output
function f (x) is computed by weighting together the responses of the units in
the hidden layer. Different functions can be computed by weighting the
outputs differently. Learning in the network consists of finding the appropriate
weights for the desired function.
individual basis units. A finite set of basis units can thus cover the
whole input and output spaces. The responses of all these basis
units together constitute a population code (Pouget and Snyder,
2000).
Since we know that the input can be described by a small
number of variables (here the position and orientation of the
object combined with the instruction to look at the left or right
part of it), it is clear that the responses of the basis function
units implicitly codes for this low-dimensional space. Similarly,
the output is a point in a two dimensional space consisting of
the possible targets for the saccade. We can thus interpret the
operation of the network as a mapping from a four-dimensional
to a two-dimensional space, although the computations are made
implicitly in a high-dimensional space as a linear combination of
basis unit responses.
Similar models have been proposed to explain the sensory-
motor transformations necessary to reach for a visually identified
object (Zipser and Andersen, 1988). For example, to point at a
visual target the brain needs to take into account the position
of the target on the retinas of the two eyes, the orientation of
the head and eyes and the posture of the body. To compute the
location of the target relative to the hand, the target must first be
identified on the retina and then it is necessary to compensate for
the location of the eyes relative to the hand and the rest of body.
This can be viewed as a sequence of coordinate transformations,
but it is also possible that, like in Deneve and Pouget’s (2003)
model, the target location could be found in a single step by
mapping from a space coding retinal position and the positions
of all the relevant joints. In either case, these computations can be
made asmappings between population codes in different layers of
a network (Zipser and Andersen, 1988; Eliasmith and Anderson,
2003).
The relative roles of retinal target position and joint angles
can be seen in an experiment by Henriques et al. (2003). The
experiment showed that reaching is easier when we look directly
at the target compared to when the target is off-gaze. This
indicates that the orientation of the eyes has a larger influence on
the movement than the retinal position of the target and supports
the idea that joint position are used in computations of spatial
locations. The result is probably a consequence of the fact that we
most often look directly at an object we try to reach.
In the brain, the mapping from the retinal position and eye
direction to the external target location that controls reaching
movements is believed to take place in the posterior parietal
cortex (PPC) (Jeannerod, 1997). Zipser and Andersen (1988)
looked at the responses of the neurons in area 7a of PPC
and trained an artificial neural network on the mapping from
eye direction and retinal position to head-centered coordinates.
The network consisted of three layers where units in the first
layer code for retinal position and eye direction. The activity
of the output layer indicated the head-centered location of the
target. The model produced similar response properties as the
real neurons of PPC. The neurons in the hidden layer became
tuned to retinal position but they are also modulated by eye
position. Like the saccade control described above, this learned
mapping fulfills the criteria of monotonicity, continuity and
convexity.
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The type of population coding that is found in area 7a,
and that also emerges in the hidden layer of the model, is
often called a gain field (Zipser and Andersen, 1988; Buneo and
Andersen, 2006). Like other types of population coding, different
neurons take care of different parts of the mapping and the
final result is obtained by weighing together the contributions of
each neuron (Figures 3, 4). However, a gain field is characterized
by the fact that the neurons are primarily organized along
only some of the input dimensions. For example, Zipser and
Andersen (1988) found that neurons coding for target position
were retinotopically tuned, but responded differently depending
on the eye positions.
Salinas and Abbott (1995) also addressed the question of
how the brain can transfer information from sensory to motor
system using population codes. They investigated the coordinate
transformations in visually guided reaching and proposed a
model that uses a Hebbian learning mechanism to learn the
sensory-motor mapping. Unlike Zipser and Andersen, they
assume that the input space is already covered by a large
set of prototypes coded by a set of basis units. They view
the problem of eye–hand coordination as a form of function
approximation where the problem is to find the appropriate
weights for the outputs of each basis unit to obtain the desired
mapping (Figure 4). They show how these weights can be learned
using Hebbian learning and the general model they present can
be used to describe arbitrary mappings between spaces.
We now turn to the slightly more complicated situation where
reaching is followed by grasping an object. Here, we not only need
to locate the target, we also need to shape the hand in the correct
way both before reaching the object and subsequently to grasp it.
Despite the added complexity, this too can be seen as a mapping
between two spaces. In the case that only visual information is
used, the input space codes for the location and the shape of the
object while the output space minimally contains the movement
direction for reaching, the parameters to preshape the hand and
finally the force vectors to perform the grasping movement.
Although little is known about how shapes are represented in
the brain, work in mathematics (Kendall, 1984) and computer
graphics (Blanz and Vetter, 1999; Kilian et al., 2007) show that it
is possible to design shape spaces where different shapes can be
synthesized from combinations of basic shapes in a way that is
similar to how basis units work together to represent a point in a
space using a population code. For a known rigid object however,
it is sufficient to code the orientation of the object. This can be
done in a three dimensional space of the rotation angles that
describes the orientation of the object2. The orientation can be
represented in a way similar to position by a set of basis units that
together code for all possible orientations of the object. Here the
final mapping is between a six-dimensional space representing
position and orientation to a space that represents the critical
parameters of the reaching movement.
There are a number of spaces that could potentially
be involved in eye–hand coordination. Depending on task
2Euler angles are generally problematic as orientation representations, in particular
because they do not fulfill the three criteria of monotonicity, continuity and
convexity. However, there exist other representations, such as quarternions,
that do.
constraints, the brain is thought to use both egocentric and
allocentric representations of space (Crawford et al., 2004) and
there is evidence that neurons in PPC code for targets in relation
to both gaze (Batista et al., 1999) and hand (Buneo and Andersen,
2006). Investigating spatial representations for reaching in the
superior parietal lobule (SPL) of PPC, Buneo and Andersen
(2006) found evidence for representations of targets in both eye-
centered coordinates and of the difference in position between
the hand and target.
Figure 5 summarizes some of the coordinate systems involved
in eye–hand coordination. The target object can be represented in
either allocentric or one of the egocentric spaces. For reaching,
an egocentric frame of reference is more suitable but as we
have seen, there are several egocentric spaces corresponding
at least to the eye and the hand, but it is likely that many
more exist and presumably the brain is able to map freely
between them. To grasp an object, its representation must be
mapped on the space that contains the possible motor actions.
The dimensionality of this space is high enough to contain all
possible grasp movements, but still of limited dimensionality.
For the brain to learn these mapping in an efficient way, it
is necessary that where possible, these mappings fulfill the
three conditions of monotonicity, continuity and convexity.
We submit that population codes are used to make this
possible.
6. MECHANISMS
Population codes of spaces as described above are instances of
a coding scheme where each input is coded by the distance to
a number of prototypes. The optimal stimulus for each neuron,
or basis unit, in the population can be considered the prototype
for that unit. One such form of population coding is given by
the chorus transform proposed by Edelman (1999) who calls it a
FIGURE 5 | Coordinate systems in eye–hand coordination. The position
of an object can be coded in in relation to allocentric space, the eye or the
hand and potentially also other parts of the body. To reach and grasp the
object, the brain must map representations of the object from a sensory space
to a motor space in order to control the arm and hand in an appropriate way.
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“chorus of prototypes.” In the simplest case, the response of each
unit is the similarity to the prototype measured by some suitable
metric. Figure 6 shows an example of a chorus transform. The
input to the transform is an image of a face. This face is compared
to each of five face prototypes and the resulting transform is
the set of similarity measurements. The chorus transform thus
describes a type of population coding of the input.
An important property of the chorus transform is that it
preserves Voronoi tessellations of the input space (Edelman,
1999, p. 268). It also approximately preserves the inter-point
distances in the original space. This means that category
boundaries in the input space are mostly preserved in the output
space (Edelman and Shahbazi, 2012). This has several critical
consequences for both neural coding and mappings of spatial
representations:
Stimulus generalization. The spatial representation naturally
supports generalization since novel stimuli will be coded by the
similarity to known stimuli and the coding will gradually change
if the stimulus gradually changes. There is thus a continuous
mapping from stimulus properties to the representation of the
stimulus.
Discrimination. Since discrimination borders are typically
Voronoi borders and these are mostly preserved by the coding,
it means that discrimination borders in the input space are
preserved in the coding space.
Categorization. For the same reason, categories induced by the
Voronoi tessellation are preserved in the population coding.
When looking at mapping between two spaces coded by
a population of units we note that these properties of the
chorus transform imply that a linear mapping from such a
representation also have these properties. This has consequences
for sensory-motor mapping between spaces:
Interpolation. Since similar stimuli are coded by similar
population codes, similar stimuli will be mapped to similar
FIGURE 6 | In the chorus transform (and in RBF networks) an input is
mapped to its similarity to a number or prototypes. Here, an image x is
compared to five face prototypes with different orientation. Each comparison
produces one component of the chorus transform that will here consist of five
similarity measures.
motor outputs. This is equivalent to the continuity criteria
introduced above.
Sensory-motor categories. When object categories are
represented as Voronoi borders in the stimulus space, different
stimulus categories can be mapped to different motor actions by
a single mapping. When the input crosses the Voronoi border
between two categories, so will the output, and in the same way
a small part of the input space represents a particular category,
a corresponding part of the output space can represent actions
suitable for that category. Furthermore, since Voronoi borders
are preserved in the mapping it follows that the convexity criteria
is also fulfilled by these types of mappings.
The most commonly used computational architecture that
uses the chorus transform is the radial basis function (RBF)
network (Moody and Darken, 1989). This artificial neural
network consists of three layers (Figure 4). The middle layer
consists of units that are tuned to different stimulus prototypes
and their response is maximal when the input is identical
to the prototype. The prototypes can be selected in different
ways. One possibility is to use one prototype for each exemplar
that has been encountered. Alternatively, the prototypes can be
selected by trying to cover the input space by suitably spaced
prototypes. Finally, the prototypes can be found by learning.
Once selected, each unit in the middle layer contributes to the
output depending on how well the input matches its prototype.
RBF-networks have been used in numerous applications for
both categorization and function approximation tasks and
can easily learn complex relations between their input and
output.
A type of RBF-network that is of special interest is normalizing
radial basis function networks (Bugmann, 1998). This model
differs from the standard model in that the output is normalized.
This is an operation that has been suggested to be implemented
by lateral inhibition and it is ubiquitous in the brain (Carandini
and Heeger, 2012). The importance of the normalization stage is
that it makes the output of the RBF-network consist of a convex
combination of the outputs of the individual units, where each
output is weighed by how close its prototype is to the input. This
property guarantees that the output will be a continuous function
of the input that quickly converges on the correct mapping
during learning. Like other multilayer feed-forward networks,
RBF-networks are universal approximators, which means that
they can learn any mapping between finite dimensional spaces
with any desired accuracy as long as there are a sufficient number
of hidden units.
Salinas and Abbott (1995) investigated how the number of
units influenced the accuracy of the coding and decoding of
different magnitudes. More recently, Eliasmith and Anderson
(2003) presented general mathematical recipes for how low
dimensional quantities can be coded and decoded in the brain
using population codes as well as suggestions for how such
quantities can be combined in different ways to implement
different arithmetic operations and mappings between spaces.
The same type of reasoning can be applied to many different
tasks including other sensorimotor transformations, learning
and short-term memory (Pouget and Snyder, 2000). This shows
that population codes are a general way to code quantities
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in one- or multi-dimensional spaces and to perform arbitrary
operations on them. This further supports that the machinery
available to the brain is ideally suited for processing spatial
representations.
It is interesting to note that the basis unit coding has many
similarities to approaches in control theory, such as locally
weighted learning (Atkeson et al., 1997). In fact, Stulp and Sigaud
(2015) have shown that many models and algorithms working
according to these principles use exactly the same underlying
model as the three-layer network described above. This lends
support to the idea that there is something fundamental about
these types of mechanisms where functions are computed using
units that each react to different parts of the input space and the
output is subsequently calculated as a combination of the outputs
from those individual units.
To summarize, we have proposed that mappings between
spaces consist of two steps. The first is a comparison between
the input and a number of prototypes and the second is the
weighting of the output from each prototype unit by its similarity
to the input. The chorus transform provides a good model for
the usefulness of population codes, both as a way to represent
points in psychological spaces and as a mechanism for mapping
between such spaces. RBF-networks constitute the canonical way
to model learning of such mappings, but many other models are
possible.
7. CONCLUSION
This article has treated two levels of spaces in the brain—
psychological and neurocognitive. The psychological spaces,
for example the color space, can be studied in psychophysical
experiments, in particular with the aid of discrimination or
similarity judgments. These spaces can often be represented
in a small number of dimensions and we have shown how
conceptual spaces can be used to model categorization
processes. Neurocognitive representations are implemented
implicitly using populations coding where different neurons
process different regions of the spaces and allow for efficient
mappings between spaces. Furthermore, spatial coding
naturally supports generalization from learned examples by
interpolation and extrapolation. We have also argued that
the psychological spaces naturally emerge from the neural
codings.
Although there exist examples of topographic representations
in the brain, the spatial representations are typically not
topographically organized. This is not even the case for the
representations of physical space in the hippocampus. Instead,
a population code is used to implicitly represent the spaces. The
main advantage of this is that it allows the brain to potentially
learn any functional mapping and not only those that can be
represented by mappings between two-dimensional spaces.
The main function of spatial representations is to make
the mapping from perception to action more efficient. Many
models of computations with population codes use explicit
representations of perceptual and motor variables. This is useful
when investigating what the model is doing, but does not mean
that we should expect to find such neurons in the brain, where
there is no need to decode the population codes until the final
stage when they are used to produce movements. To reveal the
low-dimensional spatial representations and tomake themmatch
the psychological results, it is necessary to decode the population
codes in a low-dimensional space but such a decoding is never
explicitly required by the brain itself.
By analyzing the neural representations and reducing them to
low-dimensional representations, we have argued that they to a
large extent can explain the structure of the psychological spaces.
Moreover, we have shown how spatial representations are useful
as a basis for categorization and sensory-motor mappings and
how they can be implicitly coded by populations of neurons. This
suggests that spatial representations can be found everywhere in
the brain.
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